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Available online ▪ ▪ ▪AbstractWe review the recent academic and policy literature on bank loan loss provisioning (LLP) to identify several advances in the literature, to
highlight some challenges in LLP research and suggest possible directions for future research with some concluding remarks. Among other
things, we observe some major advancement in country-specific and cross-country analyses and substantial interaction between LLPs and
existing prudential, accounting, institutional firm characteristic, cultural, religious, tax and fiscal framework. We observe that managerial
discretion in provisioning does not necessarily generate LLP estimates that reflect the true and underlying economic reality of banks' credit risk
exposure but rather managerial discretion in provisioning is strongly linked to income smoothing, capital management, signalling and other
objectives. We also address several issues including the ethical dimensions of income smoothing, motivations and constrains to income
smoothing, methodological issues in the bank loan loss provisions literature and the dynamic loan loss provisioning experiment. Moreover, we
suggest several avenues for further research such as: finding a balance between sufficient LLPs which regulators want versus transparent LLPs
which standard setters want; the sensitivity of abnormal (specific and general) LLPs to changes in equity; the persistence of abnormal LLPs
following CEO exit; country-specific interventions that induce LLP procyclicality in emerging countries; investigating LLP behaviour in the
post-financial crisis sample period; the impact of Basel III on banks' provisioning discretion; LLP behaviour among systemic and non-systemic
financial institutions; etc. We conclude that, because provisioning models are only as good as the assumptions underlying such models as well as
the accuracy of the inputs included in such models, regulators need to pay attention to how much discretion banks and lending institutions should
have in determining reported provision estimates, and this has been a long standing issue.
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Banks are financial institutions that primarily collect de-
posits and issue loan to individuals, firms and governments to
finance consumption, investment and capital expenditure;
thereby contributing to economic growth. Bank lending to
borrowers often give rise to credit risk if borrowers are unable* Corresponding author.
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).to repay the principal and/or interest on the loan facility due to
unfavourable economic conditions and related factors. To
mitigate credit risk, in principle, banks will set aside a specific
amount as a cushion to absorb expected loss on banks' loan
portfolio and this amount is referred to as loan loss provisions
(LLPs) or provisions for bad debts; therefore, loan loss pro-
vision estimate is a credit risk management tool used by banks
to mitigate expected losses on bank loan portfolio.
Bank LLP continue to receive much attention from bank
regulators/supervisors and accounting standard setters because
(i) banks' large amount of loan on their balance sheet makes
them vulnerable to loan default arising from deterioratings research: A review, Borsa _Istanbul Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
ting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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requiring banks to keep sufficient LLPs in anticipation of
expected loan losses (Laeven & Majnoni, 2003), (ii) LLPs are
often procyclical and could worsen an existing recession if
unanticipated, and this was evident at the peak of the 2008
global financial crisis as many US and European banks
significantly increased their LLP estimates which further
eroded bank profit and led to losses that depleted bank capital,
requiring Central Bank intervention in the form of bailouts,
(iii) bank LLP is a significant accrual and bank managers have
significant discretion in the determination of LLP estimates
and such discretion can be exploited to meet opportunistic
financial reporting objectives rather than solely for credit risk
purposes (Wahlen, 1994), (iv) bank LLP estimate is a crucial
micro-prudential surveillance tool that bank supervisors use to
assess the quality of banks' loan portfolio, (v) bank LLP is also
a crucial indicator of the informativeness of bank accruals
from an accounting standard-setting perspective, and (vi) bank
LLP has become the most debated accounting number in bank
financial reporting after bank profitability and derivatives since
the 2008 global financial crisis.
Bank LLPs play a crucial role for bank stability and
soundness while fulfilling their lending function to individuals,
firms and governments; therefore, bank regulators require
banks to keep adequate (or sufficient) LLPs to mitigate ex-
pected losses although there is no agreement among banks for
what constitutes ‘adequate’ or ‘sufficient’ loan loss provi-
sioning. Moreover, despite the growing concern that bank
managers can opportunistically exploit their discretion to
overstate LLPs when expected credit risks are actually low,
bank supervisors still require banks to maintain higher LLPs
persistently as a safety net for present or future loan losses.
In the literature, we commend Wall and Koch (2000)'s early
review that present a broad overview on bank loan loss pro-
visions for over a decade now. Since Wall and Koch (2000),
emerging studies have examined several issues in the loan loss
provisioning literature including: provisioning behaviour dur-
ing fluctuating business cycles and crisis periods (Laeven &
Majnoni, 2003; El Sood, 2012; Agenor and Zilberman,
2015), how procylical LLPs contribute to systemic risk and
financial system instability (Borio, Furfine, & Lowe, 2001, pp.
1e57; Wong, Fong, & Choi, 2011), dynamic provisioning to
mitigate LLP procyclicality (Saurina, 2009; Perez et al.,
2011), the role of LLP in bank earnings management, regu-
latory capital management, signalling and tax management
(Lobo & Yang, 2001; Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Yang, 2005;
Anandarajan, Hasan, & McCarthy, 2007; Perez, Salas-
Fumas, & Saurina, 2008; Ozili, 2015, 2017a,b; Andries, Gal-
lemore, & Jacob, 2017), bank manager's provisioning discre-
tion under different accounting and regulatory regimes (Alali
and Jaggi, 2011; Hamadi, Heinen, Linder, & Porumb, 2016;
Kilic, Lobo, Ranasinghe, & Sivaramakrishnan, 2012;
Leventis, Dimitropoulos, & Anandarajan, 2011; Marton &
Runesson, 2017; Ryan & Keeley, 2013; Wezel, Lau, &
Columba, 2012), provisioning and competition (Dou, Ryan,
& Zou, 2016), provisioning under different auditor type,
reputation and specialism (Dahl, 2013; Kanagaretnam, Lim, &Please cite this article in press as: Ozili, P. K.,& Outa, E., Bank loan loss provision
j.bir.2017.05.001Lobo, 2010; Ozili, 2017a), provisioning discretion under
strong corporate governance mechanism and institutional
controls (Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Bouvatier, Lepetit, &
Strobel, 2014; Curcio & Hasan, 2015) and provisioning
behaviour in several country, regional and international con-
texts (Pain, 2003; Bryce et al., 2015; Ozili, 2017a,b, etc.).
To complement Wall and Koch (2000), we identify the need
to bring together in one article the most recent developments
in LLP research to provide a comprehensive understanding of
the role of bank LLPs for accounting information quality,
micro-prudential regulation and macro-financial stability. To
do this, we explore several strand of literature in LLP research
to identify recent advances and challenges in the literature, and
suggest possible directions for future research with some
concluding remarks.
Our analysis in this review article contributes to the extant
LLP literature in the following way. One, our review
contribute to the literature that examine the link between bank
provisioning and capital regulation as well as other counter-
cyclical policy designs aimed at ensuring banking soundness
and solvency during stressed periods. Two, by relating LLPs to
income smoothing, our survey contribute to the literature that
examine how LLP estimates are manipulated by bank man-
agers to influence the level of reported earnings which reduces
the informativeness of LLP estimates. Three, our survey
contribute to the LLP literature that examine how institutional
monitoring and corporate governance mechanisms limit bank
managers' ability to distort LLP estimates to meet opportu-
nistic financial reporting objectives. Four, our study contribute
to the policy debate about how the current incurred-loss pro-
visioning model contribute to bank instability. The incurred-
loss provisioning model is criticised for its backward-
looking characteristic and its potential to reinforce the cur-
rent state of the economy because it delay provisioning until it
is too late which makes bank provisioning procyclical with
fluctuations in the economy.
Furthermore, we did not elaborate extensively on some is-
sues, the most important ones being the following two. First, we
did not elaborate extensively on bank loan loss provisioning
among Islamic banks because the distinction between Islamic
and conventional banks is often unclear and the provisioning
rules for both Islamic and conventional banks are the same.
Second, we did not elaborate extensively on dynamic provi-
sioning because research on dynamic provisioning to date ap-
pears to be biased towards single country analyses, notably
Spain, Chile, Peru and Uruguay. Likewise, we did not elaborate
on the relationship between discretionary provisions and stock
returns because changes in stock prices may be driven strongly
by other unobservable factors rather than discretionary loan loss
provisions. Therefore, our remarks on the challenges and
prospects of LLP research in this review article are limited to
issues in the literature that we find to be particularly significant.
Finally, while we note that the value of a research review is
measured by its success to inspire researchers to produce new
ideas to this line of research, our aim in this review is to elicit
comments and stimulate debates that can potentially advance
LLP research in the broader banking literature.s research: A review, Borsa _Istanbul Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
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2 discusses the key prudential regulatory changes in loan loss
provisioning under Basel I, II, III and their salient features
focussing on LLP and capital adequacy requirements. Section
3 discusses several advances in the LLP literature. Section 4
highlights the major research areas and future direction. Sec-
tion 5 discusses ethical income smoothing and factors influ-
encing income smoothing behaviour. Section 6 discusses
methodological advances and issues in the literature. Section 7
presents some challenges in LLP research. Section 8 suggests
some directions for future research. Section 9 provides some
comments and concluding remarks.
2. Basel regulation and loan loss provisions2.1. Basel IBasel I require banks to keep regulatory capital equal to at
least 8% of risk-weighted assets (BCBS, 2001).1,2 More pre-
cisely, loan loss provisions (or reserves) account for 1.25% of
risk-weighted assets in Tier 2 capital under Basel I. Under
Basel 1, provisions (or reserves) for US banks are about 1.25%
of risk-weighted assets and bank regulators in other countries
can exercise their own discretion to exceed the 1.25% limit to
meet the perceived regulatory needs of the banking system in
each country. The inclusion of provisions (or reserves) in the
computation of regulatory capital allow banks with low reg-
ulatory capital to increase LLP estimates to compensate for
low regulatory capital ratios which constitutes regulatory
capital management (Ahmed, Takeda, & Thomas, 1999).
Basel I was criticised because capital requirements were
mainly determined by fixed risk-weights attached to categories
of borrowers such as individuals, businesses, government or
banks, and it disregard any changes in the creditworthiness of
a borrower category over the life span of the loan facility,
implying that LLP estimates for each credit risk category was
not continuously risk-adjusted to reflect changes in the credit
worthiness of borrowers; consequently, banks had inadequate1 The 1988 Basel I Accord was the first attempt to establish international
standards for bank capital adequacy. Since 1988, bank capital regulation has
evolved as new Basel regulations modify and replace previous Basel capital
regulations.
2 The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) report in 2004
require banks to set aside capital for three types of risk: credit risk, market risk
and operational risk. Credit risk is the risk that counterparties to a loan or
derivative transaction may default in fulfilling their obligations. Credit risk
requires the highest regulatory capital because it is the biggest risk banks face
due to their lending activities. Market risk is the risk arising from banks'
trading operations; it is the risk that a sudden change in price would lead to a
significant loss on the market value of its trading securities. Operational risk is
the risk a bank faces arising from failed systems, people, internal processes
and other external factors (BCBS, 2004). Bank regulatory capital has two
components: Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital. Tier 1 capital consists of equity
(goodwill is subtracted from equity) and non-cumulative perpetual preferred
stock. Tier 2 capital includes instruments such as cumulative perpetual
preferred stock and subordinated debt. Basel I accord requires at least 50% of
regulatory capital (that is, 4% of risk-weighted assets) to be Tier 1 capital, and
also require 2% of risk weighted assets to be common equity (Hull, 2012).
Please cite this article in press as: Ozili, P. K., & Outa, E., Bank loan loss provision
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estimates backward-looking and procyclical (Bikker & Hu,
2002; Danielsson et al., 2001). Furthermore, Basel I was
also criticised for being procyclical with changing economic
conditions (Jackson et al., 1999) because during bad times
banks would avoid risky activities and reduce lending in an
attempt to keep fewer regulatory capital, and this behaviour is
unacceptable to regulators who want banks to keep higher
capital buffers during bad times. Consequently, banks would
overstate their specific provisions (or reserves) to compensate
for their low regulatory capital ratio, thereby transmitting
additional procyclicality to the financial system, as excessive
increase in provisions further decreases bank profit (Ahmed
et al., 1999; Borio et al., 2001, pp. 1e57; Cavallo &
Majnoni, 2002, pp. 319e342). If a recession sets in and is
prolonged, additional increase in LLPs would further decrease
bank profits, depleting bank capital and reinforce the existing
recession (Bikker & Metzemakers, 2005); hence, the need for
a revised Basel 1 capital standard.2.2. Basel IIBasel I was revised and became Basel II and was imple-
mented by bank supervisors across several countries in 2007
(BCBS, 2004). The main purpose of Basel II was to introduce
a more risk-sensitive methodology to determine the minimum
capital required to absorb losses, especially credit losses.
According to BCBS (2004), Basel II is based on three pillars:
minimum capital requirements, supervisory review and market
discipline.3 Pillar 1 describes the methodology for calculating
minimum capital requirements. Pillar I maintained minimum
capital requirement at 8% of risk-weighted assets. Under Pillar
1, the determination of the minimum capital requirement for
banks is based on three approaches: the internal risk-based
(IRB) approach, the standardised approach and the advanced
measurement approach. The internal risk-based (IRB)
approach requires banks to rely on their own risk assessment
of borrowers' credit risk to determine their risk weights. Under
the IRB approach, banks should ensure that expected losses
are fully covered via LLPs. When expected losses are greater
than provisions, banks have to deduct the difference from
capital on the basis of 50% deduction from Tier 1 capital and
50% from Tier 2 capital. If expected losses are less than
provisions, banks should recognise the difference in Tier 2
capital up to a maximum of 0.6 percent of risk-weighted as-
sets. The standardised approach requires banks to determine
risk weights based on external credit ratings. Under the
standardised approach, banks should include loan loss reserves
up to a maximum of 1.25% risk-weighted assets. The3 Pillar 2 ‘supervisory review’ involves the supervision of banks to ensure
that bank capital is commensurate with the level of risk banks take. Pillar 3
‘market discipline’ aims to foster market transparency so that market partic-
ipants and bank counterparties can better assess bank capital adequacy and
bank risks. Under Pillar 3, the Central Bank or bank regulators/supervisors
have full responsibility to ensure that all banks disclose sufficient information
about the way they allocate capital for the risks they take.
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choose their own methodology for assessing risk provided it is
thoroughly comprehensive and systemic. Overall, Basel II
Pillar 1 was designed to ensure that bank capital covers un-
expected losses while loan loss provisions cover expected loan
losses (Majnoni, Miller, & Powell, 2004).4 Basel II was also
criticised for being procyclical with fluctuating economic
conditions (see Turner, 2000; Borio et al., 2001, pp. 1e57;
Danielsson et al., 2001; Segoviano and Lowe, 2002; Repullo,
Saurina, & Trucharte, 2010).2.3. Basel IIIBasel III capital accord proposes the expected ‘through-the-
cycle’ loan loss provisioning system to be fully introduced in
June 2018. This provisioning system is similar to Basel II
because it also anticipates loan losses before it materialises.
However, the main criticism of Basel II's loan loss provi-
sioning system was that it allows provisioning only at one
point in time, say, at the beginning of the reporting year or
quarterly or semi-annually (Hull, 2012; Wezel et al., 2012).
Basel III improves on Basel II by introducing a loan loss
provisioning system that require banks and financial in-
stitutions to set aside specific provisions on newly-originated
loans based on individual borrower characteristics that drives
the performance of the loan (Wezel et al., 2012).5 This means
that the level of LLPs associated with a specific loan will be
determined from the outset based on a set of bank-specific and
borrower-specific criteria even though the loan impairment has
not occurred yet, or is unlikely to occur in the near future
(Wezel et al., 2012). Under Basel III, banks will increase the
quality of LLP estimates by (i) improving the quality of the
underlying data that generates provisions buffers, and (ii)
introduce through-the-cycle LLP estimates. The former will
allow banks to eliminate flaws in current LLP models and
processes especially the inaccuracies that typically generate
unnecessarily high (or low) and insufficient buffers and to
ensure that data quality on collateral are optimal rather than
suboptimal. This ensures that subsequent discretionary in-
creases in provisions for each credit risk category would bring
provisioning closer to expected loss on each credit risk cate-
gory. The latter ensures that banks that adopt a through-the-
cycle approach for probability of default (PD) estimates and4 The distinction between loan losses covered by bank capital and loan
losses covered by LLPs is sometimes blurred because (i) bank capital is
derived partly from loan loss provisions (or reserves), and also because (ii)
general provision is included in Basel's definition of bank capital (Hull, 2012);
therefore, regulatory capital requirements should include sufficient loan loss
provisions due to the close relationship between loan loss provisions and
capital (Banque de France, 2001; Cavallo & Majnoni, 2002, pp. 319e342).
5 One major distinction between the ‘expected through-the-cycle provi-
sioning system’ and ‘dynamic loan loss provisioning system’ is that dynamic
provisioning gradually builds a pool of general provisions (not specific pro-
visions) to cover eventual losses while the expected through-the-cycle provi-
sioning systems makes specific provisions on each loan made to individuals or
corporations.
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Banks will retain significant discretion in the determination
of LLP estimates and bank managers must ensure that the
application of Basel III provisioning standards are driven by
sound credit risk management considerations (Wezel et al.,
2012). Some policy researchers argue that the expected
through-the-cycle provisioning system is a purer method to
anticipate loan losses and that it has the merits of being in line
with Basel II principles (Angelini et al., 2015; Blundell-
Wignall & Atkinson, 2010), keeping in mind that the num-
ber and type of applicable levers would vary from bank to
bank based on each bank's initial asset composition taking into
account their trading versus banking book, the proportion of
securitised assets in each bank's trading book, etc., as well as
whether they have already successfully implemented the new
Basel III measures ahead of the implementation date; there-
fore, a one-size-fits-all approach to implementing the new
provisioning model may not be ideal for all banks. Table 1
summarises the evolution of Basel I, II and III regulations,
and their salient features focussing on LLP and capital ade-
quacy requirements.
3. Loan loss provisions research: advances in the
literature3.1. Importance of LLP researchLLP research remains a fruitful area in banking research for
four main reasons. One, LLP is a significant discretionary
accrual at the disposal of bank managers. Two, LLP has a
direct impact on bank interest margin, and consequently af-
fects bank overall earnings. Three, LLP is linked to bank
regulators' micro-prudential surveillance and is linked to the
informativeness of accounting disclosures in financial reports
required by accounting standard-setters. Four, the availability
of bank-year data on LLP estimates makes LLP research is
fruitful area. Moreover, while LLP research may be compli-
cated by: (i) the process that determine LLP estimates
(including the assumptions, methodology and other unob-
servable managerial choices taken into consideration) and (ii)
the cross-country differences in the accounting for LLPs
across countries, researchers continue to exploit the variation
in LLP practices to deepen our understanding of the factors
that influence the level of discretionary LLPs.3.2. Classification by contextual studies
3.2.1. Country-specific studies: evidence
Emerging country-specific studies since Wall and Koch
(2000) show that the value relevance of reported LLP esti-
mates as well as the determinants of the level of discretionary
LLPs are influenced by unique national characteristics.
Norden and Stoian (2013) examine how bank earnings man-
agement relate to bank risk management. They examine 85
Dutch banks from 1998e2012 and find that (i) Dutch banks
use LLPs to lower earnings volatility, and (ii) increase LLPss research: A review, Borsa _Istanbul Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
Table 1
Basel regulation, LLP treatment and capital adequacy under Basel Accord.
Basel I Basel II Basel III
Basel Evolution An agreement was reached to develop an
international risk-based standard for bank
capital regulation in 1988.
Basel II emerged from the proposal
to correct the weaknesses of Basel 1
in 1999, which later became known
as Basel II.
Following the 2007/2008 financial
crisis and the criticism against Basel
II, the Basel committee's proposal for
a major change to Basel II led to
Basel III. Basel III has 6 key
regulations: capital definition and
requirement; capital conservation
buffer; countercyclical buffer;
leverage ratio; liquidity ratio;
countercyclical credit risk.
Proposed or adoption date 1988 Basel II proposal was revised in 2001
& 2003; published in 2004;
implemented in 2007
Basel III was first published in 2009
and a final version was published in
2010.
Amended date Proposal to amend Basel I was issued in 1995.
Final amendment in 1996 became known as the
1996 amendment, and was implemented in
1998.
Basel II was amended in 2011 after
the 2007e2009 financial crisis.
Amended Basel II became Basel 2.5
Currently, there are unofficial
speculations suggesting the need to
amend Basel III to give way for
Basel IV
Reason for amendment In 1995, Basel I was amended to incorporate
netting. In 1996, Basel I was amended to
allocate capital for market risk associated with
trading activities.
Basel II gave banks significant
discretion in calculating regulatory
capital, which was later criticised as
a move towards bank self-regulation.
Additionally, the 2007/2008 financial
crisis occurred just after
implementing Basel II, and further
increased the criticism against Basel
II. Notably, there was the need to
change the way capital for market
risk was calculated. Amended Basel
2.5 increased capital for market risk
Basel III: (i) increased capital for
credit risk, (ii) tightened the
definition of capital, and (iii)
addressed the issue of liquidity risk.
To date, there is no official reason for
any major amendment to Basel III,
because Basel III has not been fully
implemented yet and its full effect is
yet to be known.
LLP treatment Loan loss reserves (or provisions) account for
1.25% of risk-weighted assets in Tier 2 capital,
although bank regulators in each country can
exercise their own discretion to exceed the 1.25
per cent limit to meet the regulatory needs of the
banking industry in each country.
Under Basel II, the provisioning
model anticipates loan losses before
they materialise. Under the IRB
approach, expected losses are fully
covered via LLPs, and the difference
between LLPs and expected losses
are charged against capital. Under
the standardised approach, banks
include loan loss reserves up to a
maximum of 1.25% risk-weighted
assets. The advanced measurement
(AMA) approach require banks to
choose their own methodology for
assessing risk (and provisions)
provided it is thoroughly
comprehensive and systemic.
LLPs are determined based on the
‘expected through-the-cycle loan loss
provisioning system’. This
provisioning system anticipates
expected losses and require banks
and financial institutions to set aside
specific provisions on newly-
originated loans based on individual
borrower characteristics that
drives the performance of the loan.
Managers have significant discretion
in determination of loan loss
provision estimates under Basel III.
Capital adequacy requirement Bank regulatory capital is set at 8% of risk-
weighted assets. At least 50% of required capital
(i.e. 4% of risk-weight assets) is included as Tier
1 capital, while 2% of risk-weight assets is
required to be common equity.
Regulatory capital is set at 8% of
risk-weighted assets Under Pillar 1,
banks must use robust credit risk
management techniques to allocate
capital for credit risk, market risk and
operational risk. Pillar 2&3 includes
supervisory oversight and market
discipline
Tier 1 equity capital must be at least
4.5% of risk-weighted assets at all
times, and total tier 1 capital (which
is tier 1 capital plus additional Tier 1
capital) must be at 6% of risk-
weighted assets at all times. Tier 1
and Tier 2 requirement is the same as
under Basel 1 and 2.
Weaknesses (i) All loans by a bank to a corporation had the
same risk-weight; and (ii) there was no model
for default correlation.
Basel II or 2.5 had a loose definition
of bank capital, allocated insufficient
capital for credit risks, and did not
have a robust solution to address
liquidity risk
Yet to be fully implemented and its
weakness are yet to be known.
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+ MODELwhen earnings are high and lower LLPs when they have low
regulatory capital ratios. In Italy, Caporale et al. (2015)
examine 400 Italian banks during the 2001e2012 period and
find that bank provisioning is driven by its non-discretionary
components especially during the 2008e2012 recession
compared to its discretionary component. They did not find
evidence for income smoothing among Italian banks.
In Spain, Perez et al. (2008) investigate whether the dy-
namic (or statistical) provisioning system adopted by Spanish
banks had an impact on the earnings smoothing and capital
management behaviour of Spanish banks. They find that
Spanish banks use LLPs to smooth earnings but not to manage
capital during the period of analysis. Anandarajan, Hasan, and
Lozano-Vivas (2003) examine the behaviour of LLPs among
Spanish banks after the implementation of Basel I capital
adequacy regulations in the Spanish banking industry in 1992,
and find that Spanish commercial banks use LLPs to manage
reported earnings but not to manage regulatory capital;
implying that the 1992 capital adequacy regulation removed
any capital constraint that discouraged income smoothing.
In China, Wu et al. (2015) examine the impact of foreign
investor ownership on the use of LLPs to smooth reported
earnings. They claim that in 2004 the Chinese government
required local banks to invite foreign financial institutions to
become shareholders in the local banks, and referred to these
foreign financial institutions as the ‘foreign strategic investors
(FSIs)’. They investigate whether Chinese banks with zero,
one or two FSIs have more or less incentive to use LLPs to
smooth reported earnings. They examine 102 Chinese banks
during the 2006e2011 period, and find that banks with more
foreign strategic investors use LLPs to smooth reported
earnings. Curcio, Dyer, Gallo, and Gianfrancesco (2014) test
the income smoothing hypothesis and capital management
hypothesis for Chinese banks during the financial crisis, and
find that Chinese banks use discretionary LLPs to smooth bank
earnings but not to manage capital levels. They also observe
that listed Chinese banks exhibit less income smoothing
behaviour compared unlisted banks.
In Nigeria, Ozili (2015) investigate listed banks in Nigeria
during the 2004e2013 period, and find that LLPs are used for
earnings smoothing and capital management purposes during
the voluntary IFRS adoption but find weak evidence for the
use of LLPs for signalling purposes. In UK, Pain (2003) shows
that macroeconomic factors particularly real GDP growth, real
interest rates and lagged aggregate lending growth, are key
drivers of LLP estimates of UK banks. In Philippines, Floro
(2010) examines how banks' capital position influences the
management of LLPs, and find that Philippine banks use LLPs
for capital management purposes; also, they find that both
low-capitalized and well-capitalized banks keep fewer
(higher) LLPs during an economic expansion (downturn).
In Vietnam, Bryce et al. (2015) test the income smoothing,
capital management and the cyclical hypotheses and did not
find evidence for the use of LLPs to smooth income among
Vietnamese banks. In Turkey, Acar and Ipci (2015) investigate
the role of LLPs in capital and earnings management in the
Turkish banking sector during the 2005e2011 period. TheyPlease cite this article in press as: Ozili, P. K.,& Outa, E., Bank loan loss provision
j.bir.2017.05.001examine 28 commercial banks and find evidence for income
smoothing but this behaviour is reduced during the global
financial crisis (2007e2009 period). They also find that LLPs
are used to signal private information about Turkish banks'
future prospects. In Hong Kong, Abdul Adzis et al. (2016) find
that banks in Hong Kong use LLPs to smooth income but this
behaviour is reduced after the adoption of IAS 39. Taken
together, these studies show that the use of LLPs to meet
managerial or prudential expectations is widespread across
several countries depending on unique country characteristics
and unique conditions that banks face.
3.2.2. US studies
US studies, for instance, El Sood (2012) investigates the
use of LLPs to smooth reported earnings during the recent
financial crisis period by 878 US banks over the 2001e2009
period and find that US banks accelerate LLPs to smooth
earnings when (i) they hit the regulatory minimum target, (ii)
are in non-recessionary periods, and (iii) are more profitable,
and (iv) to smooth income upwards during the financial crisis.
Balboa et al. (2013) argue that the incentive for US banks to
smooth reported earnings and the practical way of doing so
partly depends on the size of pre-provision earnings. They
examine 15,268 US banks during 1996e2011 period, and find
that US banks use LLPs to smooth reported earnings when
earnings are positive and substantial. Using dynamic panel
estimation, they also observe that LLPs have a non-linear
relationship with reported earnings. Kilic et al. (2012) inves-
tigate whether the strict recognition and classification re-
quirements of SFAS 133 that reduced US banks' ability to use
derivatives to smooth earnings encouraged the affected banks
to rely more on LLPs to smooth reported earnings rather than
relying on derivatives. They find evidence that US banks use
LLPs to smooth earnings when accounting disclosure regula-
tion made it difficult to use derivatives to smooth bank earn-
ings. Other US studies include: Balla and Rose (2015), Dou
et al. (2016), Morris, Kang, and Jie (2016), etc. To sum up,
above studies suggest that the propensity for banks to use
LLPs for income smoothing purposes depends on (i) the size
of earning or the earnings distribution, (ii) the state of econ-
omy particularly during recessions or crisis periods, (iii) strict
accounting disclosure rules intended to discourage the
manipulation of bank accruals, as well as (iv) regulatory
capital requirements.
3.2.3. Middle East and North African (MENA) region
Several studies examine the LLP practices of banks in the
Middle East and North African (MENA) region by comparing
the LLP practices of Islamic banks to conventional banks.
Elnahass et al. (2014) investigate the use of reported LLPs by
investors in their valuation of banks in the MENA region
during the 2006e2011 period, and find that LLP has positive
value relevance to investors in the conventional and Islamic
banking sectors, while investors in Islamic banks value the
discretionary component relatively lower than their conven-
tional counterparts. Othman and Mersni (2014) examine the
provisioning practices of banks in the Middle East, making as research: A review, Borsa _Istanbul Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
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and (iii) conventional banks with Islamic windows. They find
that Islamic banks use discretionary LLP for both earnings and
capital management. Similarly, Taktak et al. (2010) find that
Islamic banks use LLPs to smooth income. Quttainah, Song,
and Wu (2013) find that Islamic banks are less likely to
conduct earnings management as measured by both earnings
loss avoidance and abnormal LLPs; they did not find a sig-
nificant difference in the earnings management behaviour of
Islamic banks with and without Shariah Supervisory Boards.
Farook, Hassan, and Clinch (2014) investigate the differences
in the LLP behaviour of Islamic banks compared to conven-
tional banks and find that Islamic banks have lower LLPs
compared to conventional banks. Soedarmono, Pramono, and
Tarazi (2017) find that the LLPs of Islamic banks are pro-
cyclical, as higher economic growth leads to a decline in re-
ported LLP estimates; also, they observe that the use of LLPs
for capital management can overcome LLP procyclicality.
Taken together, these studies suggest that managerial discre-
tion in determining LLPs, and the value-relevance of reported
LLPs are influenced by religiosity considerations among other
factors, although some studies report conflicting evidence.
3.2.4. African region
Few regional studies examine the provisioning behaviour of
African banks. Ozili (2017a) investigates whether the way
African banks use LLPs to smooth earnings is influenced by
capital market incentives and auditor-type after controlling for
non-discretionary LLP determinants and business cycle fluc-
tuations, and find that (i) African banks use LLPs to smooth
earnings; (ii) listed African banks use LLPs to smooth earn-
ings to a greater extent compared to non-listed African banks;
(iii) income smoothing via LLPs is not reduced among African
banks with Big 4 auditor; and (iv) bank provisioning is pro-
cyclical with fluctuations in the business cycle. Amidu and
Kuipo (2015) investigate earnings management behaviour
among African banks, and find that African banks manage
earnings, and earnings quality among African banks is influ-
enced by bank activity mix and the mode of bank funding. To
sum up, the few findings for Africa suggests that African
banks have unique incentives that influence them to use LLPs
to meet financial reporting outcomes.
3.2.5. European region
Some studies examine the LLP practices of European
banks. Leventis et al. (2011) investigate the use of LLPs for
earnings and capital management and signalling purposes
among 91 listed European banks that adopt IFRS standards,
and find evidence that both early and late-adopters of IFRS
both use LLPs to smooth their earnings but this behaviour is
reduced after IFRS adoption. Curcio and Hasan (2015)
examine the case of Euro and non-Euro Area credit during
the 1996e2006 period, and find that non-Euro Area credit
institutions use LLPs to smooth reported earnings but did not
find similar evidence for Euro Area credit institutions. Skala
(2015) investigates the context of Central European banks.
After building upon Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988)'s idea ofPlease cite this article in press as: Ozili, P. K., & Outa, E., Bank loan loss provision
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ropean banks use LLPs to smooth earnings when they have
high earnings possibly to save for the rainy day. Bouvatier
et al. (2014) find that European commercial banks with
concentrated ownership use LLPs to smooth reported earnings.
Ozili (2017b) finds that the LLPs of European banks are driven
by both credit risk and income smoothing considerations.
Bonin and Kosak (2013) investigate the procyclical behaviour
of LLPs among banks in 11 emerging European countries and
find evidence that banks in the emerging European region use
LLPs to smooth reported earnings. Curcio, De Simone, and
Gallo (2017) examine the use of discretionary LLPs during
the recent financial crisis, when Euro Area banks experienced
deteriorating loan quality and significant reduction in profit-
ability but were also subject to a new form of stricter super-
vision, namely the EBA 2010 and 2011 stress test exercises.
They find evidence for income smoothing via LLPs implying
that banks subject to EBA stress tests had higher incentives to
smooth income only for the 2011 EBA exercise, when a larger
and more detailed set of information was released. Taken
together, these studies suggest that the propensity for Euro-
pean banks to manipulate LLP estimates is influenced by (i)
procyclical macroeconomic conditions (ii) strict accounting
disclosure rules, and (iii) bank regulation and supervision in
the region.
3.2.6. Asian and Australian region
Other studies examine the provisioning of banks in
Australia and Asia. For instance, Anandarajan et al. (2007)
examine whether Australian banks use LLPs to smooth re-
ported earnings, manage regulatory capital or to signal private
information. They find that evidence for aggressive earnings
smoothing in the post-Basel period among publicly traded
banks. Cummings and Durrani (2016) investigate the effect of
Basel capital requirements on the LLP practices of Australian
banks. They show that Australia follows two provisioning
regimes: a forward-looking model for regulatory purposes
(regulatory provisions) and an incurred loss model for finan-
cial reporting (accounting provisions), and find that regulatory
provisions reflect the default risk of banks' loan portfolios and
banks allocate surplus capital above Basel minimum re-
quirements to pre-fund future credit losses through LLPs,
implying that Australian bank managers use their discretion in
setting LLPs to dampen the impact of fluctuations in credit
market conditions on their lending activities. Eng and Nabar
(2007) investigate LLPs for three Asian countries: Hong
Kong, Malaysia and Singapore during the 1993e2000 period,
and find that abnormal (or unexpected) LLPs are positively
related to bank stock returns and future cash flows indicating
that Asian bank managers increase LLPs to signal favourable
cash flow prospects. Packer and Zhu (2012) examine the
provisioning practices of Asian banks while controlling for
income smoothing incentives. They examine 240 banks from
12 countries: Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand during the 2000e2009 period. Their
sample period of analysis was intended to capture the effect ofs research: A review, Borsa _Istanbul Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
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for income smoothing purposes as well as evidence for
countercyclical loan loss provisioning among Asian countries
particularly in India. Taken together, the studies suggest that
LLPs are used to smooth income and to dampen the pro-
cyclical impact of fluctuating credit market conditions.
3.2.7. International/cross-regional studies
Cavallo and Majnoni (2002), concerned about the pro-
cyclical effect of LLPs on bank capital regulation, investi-
gate whether banks provision for bad loans in good times
while controlling for banks' incentive to use LLPs to smooth
reported earnings. They examine 1176 commercial banks
divided into 804 banks from G10 countries and 372 from non-
G10 over the 1988e1999 period. After controlling for
different country-specific macroeconomic and institutional
factors, they find evidence for income smoothing among G10
banks but not for non-G10 banks. Fonseca and Gonzalez
(2008) examine an international bank sample from 41 coun-
tries including Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Italy, Kenya,
Korea, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, USA and
Venezuela, Colombia, Greece, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand,
United Kingdom. They find evidence for bank income
smoothing via LLPs after controlling for unobservable bank
effects and for the endogeneity of explanatory variables. Also,
Kar (2015) undertook a cross-country analysis to investigate
the use of LLPs to smooth reported earnings among 1294
microfinance institutions (MFIs) from 103 countries during the
1996e2013 period. The study finds that microfinance in-
stitutions use LLPs to smooth reported earnings. The study
also observes that the LLP behaviour of microfinance in-
stitutions is procyclical with business cycle fluctuations.
Bushman and Williams (2012) investigate the case of forward-
looking loan loss provisioning among banks across 27 coun-
tries and find that banks exploit their discretion in forward-
looking provisioning to smooth bank earnings. To sum up,
the findings from the cross-country studies suggest that the
propensity for banks to use LLPs to influence financial
reporting outcomes such as income smoothing is influenced by
cross-country differences mainly macroeconomic differences
and banking supervision differences across countries, amongst
other factors; although cross-country analysis is often criti-
cised for underestimating unique country-specific factors that
drives the level of bank LLPs.3.3. Classification by three major arguments
3.3.1. LLP and capital management hypothesis
A major argument in the literature focus on whether (and
how) banks use LLPs to manage regulatory capital re-
quirements. The literature argue that, because bank regulators
require banks to keep minimum regulatory capital for the risk
they take, bank managers have some incentive to influence the
level of LLP estimates in a way that allow them to meet
minimum regulatory capital requirements if LLPs are included
in the computation of minimum regulatory capital ratios
(Ahmed et al., 1999; Moyer, 1990). When this is the case, thePlease cite this article in press as: Ozili, P. K.,& Outa, E., Bank loan loss provision
j.bir.2017.05.001capital management hypothesis states that the inclusion of
(general) loan loss provisions in the computation of regulatory
capital ratios will motivate bank managers to manipulate LLP
estimates in order to influence the level of regulatory capital
above the minimum limit (Ahmed et al., 1999; Scholes,
Wilson, & Wolfson, 1990). Further still, bank managers'
awareness of the costs associated with violating minimum
regulatory capital requirements is argued to create strong in-
centives for bank managers to use their discretion to lower
LLPs estimates to increase the bank's regulatory capital ratio
above the minimum limit (Ahmed et al., 1999). This is the
capital management hypothesis. On the other hand, Kilic et al.
(2012) and Bonin and Kosak (2013) suggest an alternative
view to the capital management hypothesis. They argue that,
in the absence of minimum regulatory capital ratios, banks
will view LLPs as a form of bank capital. They argue that,
when bank equity capital is low banks will overstate LLPs to
compensate for their low capital level and will understate
LLPs when they have sufficient equity capital, reflecting
banks' use of LLPs for capital management purposes. Empir-
ical studies that test the capital management hypothesis focus
on the negative relationship between discretionary LLP and
Tier 1 capital before LLPs or equity capital (see, Kim and
Kross, 1998; Collins, Shackelford, & Wahlen, 1995; Ahmed
et al., 1999; Lobo & Yang, 2001; Anandarajan et al., 2007;
Leventis et al., 2011; Curcio & Hasan, 2015; Ozili, 2015; etc).
3.3.2. LLP and signalling hypothesis
Another argument in the literature focus on whether (and
how) banks use LLPs to signal private information to firm
outsiders about the quality of bank loan portfolio (e.g. Ahmed
et al., 1999; Beaver & Engel, 1996; Beaver, Eger, Ryan, &
Wolfson, 1989; Griffin & Wallach, 1991; Kanagaretnam
et al., 2005; Liu & Ryan, 1995; Wahlen, 1994). Abnormal
LLP estimate is often considered to signal some information
about bank non-performing loans or to signal information
about a firm's future earnings prospect. Studies that test the
signalling hypothesis examine the statistical relationship be-
tween discretionary LLPs and one-year ahead earnings while
conclusions to support the signalling hypothesis derives from
the positive (and significant) relationship between discre-
tionary LLPs and one-year ahead (future) earnings after con-
trolling for non-discretionary LLPs determinants and other
external influences. For instance, Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and
Mathieu (2003) find that managers of undervalued banks use
LLPs to increase the level of earnings to signal banks' future
earnings prospects. Eng and Nabar (2007) investigate LLPs for
three Asian countries: Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore
during the 1993e2000 period, and find that abnormal (or
unexpected) LLPs are positively related to bank stock returns
and future cash flows indicating that Asian bank managers
increase LLPs to signal favourable cash flow prospects. Also,
they find that bank investors bid stock prices up when unex-
pected LLPs are positive. Wahlen (1994) finds similar results
for US banks. Kanagaretnam et al. (2005) examine the de-
terminants of signalling among banks and document evidence
that banks use LLPs to signal future earnings prospects ofs research: A review, Borsa _Istanbul Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
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to support the signalling hypothesis. Overall, the use of LLPs
to signal firm future prospects may depend on: the degree of
information asymmetry, differences in managerial incentive to
signal, the different conditions banks face and the extent to
which investors interpret high LLPs as a signal for improved
loan quality or as a signal in anticipation of large non-
performing loans (Beaver & Engel, 1996; Kanagaretnam
et al., 2005; Liu, Ryan, & Wahlen, 1997).
3.3.3. LLP and income smoothing
Another major argument in the literature focus on banks'
incentive to use LLPs to smooth banks' reported earnings
over time (Greenawalt & Sinkey, 1988), and this argument is
commonly referred to as the income smoothing hypothesis
which predicts that banks will use LLPs to smooth reported
earnings to make reported earnings appear stable over time to
meet some defined prudential regulatory objectives or
opportunistic financial reporting objectives (Greenawalt &
Sinkey, 1988; Wahlen, 1994). Also, some argue that when
bank earnings are high, it makes sense to regulators for banks
to set aside some of those earnings as provisions in antici-
pation of loan losses during bad years e the notion of saving
for a rainy day. They argue that when earnings are low, banks
will keep fewer LLPs in the current period and draw up from
the loan loss provisions or reserve accumulated in the pre-
vious period to cover for actual loan losses in the current
period (Greenawalt & Sinkey, 1988; Skała, 2015). Empirical
studies that investigate the income smoothing hypothesis
examine the statistical relationship between discretionary
LLPs and pre-provision and pre-tax earnings (e.g. Ahmed
et al., 1999; Laeven & Majnoni, 2003; Kanagaretnam,
Lobo, & Yang, 2004; Bikker & Metzemakers, 2005; Liu &
Ryan, 2006; Anandarajan et al., 2007; Perez et al., 2008;
Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Leventis et al., 2011; El
Sood, 2012; Curcio & Hasan, 2015; Skała, 2015; Ozili,
2017a,b).3.4. Classification by other emerging trends
3.4.1. LLP and procyclicality
A growing literature focus on the behaviour of LLPs during
fluctuating economic conditions, and argue that LLPs are
procyclical because it reinforces the current state of the
economy (Bikker & Hu, 2002; Laeven & Majnoni, 2003;
Bikker & Metzemakers, 2005; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008).
By procyclical, they mean that when banks enter a reces-
sionary period, the rational response of bank managers is to
decrease lending and increase LLPs. An increase in bank
provisioning during recessionary periods will further reduce
bank net interest margin and decrease bank overall profit and
worsen the state of banks during the recession. If the recession
is prolonged, bank capital can be completely wiped out. This
is the argument for procyclical LLP behaviour or the cycli-
cality hypothesis. To support this argument, Borio et al. (2001,
pp. 1e57) find a strong negative relationship between LLPs
and the business cycle for 10 OECD countries while BeattyPlease cite this article in press as: Ozili, P. K., & Outa, E., Bank loan loss provision
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LLPs until recessionary periods set in, reinforcing the current
state of the economy. Agenor and Zilberman (2015) show that,
under a backward-looking provisioning model, LLPs are
procyclical because provisions are triggered by past due pay-
ments (or nonperforming loans), which depends on the current
economic conditions and the loan-loss reserves-loan ratio.
Olszak, Pipien, Kowalska, and Roszkowska (2016) find that
LLPs in large, publicly-traded and commercial banks as well
as in banks reporting consolidated statements, are more pro-
cyclical while stringent capital standards and better investor
protection are associated with weakened procyclicality of LLP.
Conclusions to support the cyclicality hypothesis derives from
the negative (and significant) relationship between discre-
tionary LLPs and real gross domestic product growth rate after
controlling for non-discretionary LLP and other factors, and is
well documented in the literature (e.g. Greenawalt & Sinkey,
1988; Arpa, Giulini, Ittner, & Pauer, 2001; Borio et al.,
2001, pp. 1e57; Bikker & Hu, 2002; Pain, 2003; Beatty &
Liao, 2009; Floro, 2010; Packer & Zhu, 2012; Agenor and
Zilberman, 2015, etc.).
3.4.2. Dynamic loan loss provisioning
The growing evidence that bank LLPs are procyclical with
fluctuating economic conditions particularly in Europe and US
has led policy researchers to advocate the need for a coun-
tercyclical or dynamic loan loss provisioning system to miti-
gate LLP procyclicality. A dynamic loan loss provisioning
system is a loan loss provisioning system where banks report
higher LLPs during good economic times and report fewer
LLPs during economic downturns so that the surplus LLPs
accumulated during good economic times are used to mitigate
bank losses during economic downturns (Saurina, 2009). In
principle, the objective of a dynamic provisioning model is to
enhance the safety and soundness of banks by building up a
stock of loan loss provisions (or reserves) in good times so that
banks will not face insolvency due to rising loan losses when a
recession sets in, and banks can use the accumulated stock of
provisions to smooth out loan losses during bad times (Balla
and Mckenna, 2009).
Few countries including Spain, Peru, Columbia and Chile
have adopted a dynamic provisioning system. Bank regulators
in Spain compelled Spanish banks to adopt a dynamic LLP
system in year 2000 (Saurina, 2009). Since the adoption of a
dynamic LLP system in Spain, Spanish banks have become
the laboratory for academic and policy researchers to test the
effectiveness of a dynamic provisioning model as a solution to
eliminate or reduce LLPs' procyclical behaviour. Studies
emerging from Spanish banks show that, after adopting a
dynamic provisioning system, bank provisioning is driven
more by credit risk considerations rather than by income
smoothing and capital management considerations (see De Lis
et al., 2001; Perez et al., 2008; Saurina, 2009; Fillat &
Montoriol-Garriga, 2010; Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, & Sau-
rina Salas, 2012, etc.). For banks in Chile, Chan-Lau (2012)
finds that the adoption of dynamic provisions can enhance
bank solvency for Chilean banks but it would not help tos research: A review, Borsa _Istanbul Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
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consider other countercyclical alternative measures other than
dynamic provisions such as Basel III's proposed countercy-
clical capital buffers or the countercyclical provision rule
which Peru implemented in 2008. Wezel (2010) examines the
dynamic provisioning in Uruguay using a stress test method-
ology and find that the stock of dynamic provisions accumu-
lated since 2001 help to fully absorb medium-sized shocks
which consequently offsets the additional costs caused by
rising specific provisions during bad times.
To sum up, some argue that a robust dynamic provisioning
model should be clear about how the level of provisions buffer
is determined e whether rules-based or discretionary (de Lis
and Garcia-Herrero, 2010), and should include the stress
testing of internal loan loss models, the occurrence of fat-tails
in realised loan loses, the estimation of long-run expected
losses and the tax and accounting treatment of loan loss re-
serves (see Mann and Michael, 2002; Balla and McKenna,
2009; Chan-Lau, 2012).
3.4.3. Criticism of dynamic provisioning
Nonetheless, there are strong criticisms against a dynamic
loan loss provisioning system. One, dynamic loan loss pro-
visioning research so far is considered to be biased towards a
few single country contexts e Spain, Chile, Peru and
Uruguay. Two, the ability of a dynamic loan loss provi-
sioning system to generate sufficient provision buffers in
anticipation of stressed periods depends on the severity and
the time lag of the existing crisis or recession (Fillat &
Montoriol-Garriga, 2010), therefore, a dynamic provision-
ing system is unlikely to be sustainable if the recession is
prolonged. Three, there are concerns that dynamic loan loss
provisioning is only workable if the transition from a
recession into an economic boom, and vice versa, is easy for
policy makers to detect (Bikker & Metzemakers, 2005); in
practice, it is difficult to detect this transition because
‘business cycle developments are hard to foresee, given their
erratic duration and amplitude’ (Bikker & Metzemakers,
2005, p. 144). Four, dynamic provisions permit income and
profit smoothing which work against financial statement
transparency (FASB-IASB, 2009). Finally, some key issues
in adopting dynamic provisioning globally still abound (De
Lis and Garcia-Herrero 2010; Wezel, 2010), and these is-
sues raise more questions than answers. One, should dynamic
provisions buffer be rule-based or discretionary, keeping in
mind that accounting standard setters are more inclined to
favour a rule-based dynamic provisions process while bank
regulators are more likely to support a discretionary approach
with clearly defined methodology for determining dynamic
provisions estimates. Two, should GDP or credit supply or
loan-to-value ratio be the key variable to determine the
volume of dynamic provisions keeping in mind that GDP is a
more systemic measure while the use of credit supply is
institution-specific and the use of loan-to-value ratio is bank-
specific. Three, to what extent should dynamic provisions be
applied differently to developed countries versus emerging
countries?Please cite this article in press as: Ozili, P. K.,& Outa, E., Bank loan loss provision
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provisionsThe literature that test the capital management hypothesis
examine whether banks increase LLPs when they have insuf-
ficient equity capital to compensate for their low equity capital
levels (Bonin & Kosak, 2013; Kilic et al., 2012) or whether
banks influence LLP estimates to meet minimum regulatory
capital requirements (Ahmed et al., 1999; Moyer, 1990).
Notably, the work of Ahmed et al. (1999) is core to this strand
of literature. Ahmed et al. (1999) examine 113 US banks
during the 1986e1995 period and find that banks use LLPs to
manage minimum regulatory capital levels. Nonetheless, evi-
dence to support the capital management hypothesis is rather
mixed in the literature (Collins et al., 1995; Curcio & Hasan,
2015; Leventis et al., 2011).
Going forward, it is not clear whether the change in LLP (in
response to changes in equity capital) is driven by incremental
changes in ‘specific’ or ‘general’ provisions. In other words,
while banks can overstate (understate) LLPs when they are
undercapitalised (overcapitalised), it is not clear whether the
incremental increase (decrease) in LLPs is targeted at specific
provisions or general provisions or both. Future research is
needed to shed more light on whether abnormal changes in
LLPs in response to changes in bank equity level are signifi-
cantly associated with specific or general provisions.4.2. Abnormal LLPs and CEO exitThe literature that test the signalling hypothesis examine
whether banks use abnormal changes in LLPs to signal in-
formation about firms' future prospects, implying that bank
managers possibly report abnormal LLP estimates in antici-
pation of high future earnings or in anticipation of high non-
performing loans (Kanagaretnam et al., 2005; Liu & Ryan,
1995; Liu et al., 1997). To extend the signalling debate,
banks can report abnormal LLPs to mitigate losses arising
from the loss of customer loyalty or loss of profitable business
deals following the departure of a CEO whose influence is tied
to greater customer loyalty and greater business deals for the
bank. Future research investigating the LLP-signalling hy-
pothesis could provide insights on whether abnormal LLPs are
used by bank managers to signal the consequence of the
sudden departure of a CEO that brings good business deals for
the bank or to signal the removal of a bad CEO. The future
researcher can empirically examine the association between
abnormal LLPs in the quarter(s) before the announcement of
CEO exit compared to abnormal LLPs in the immediate
quarter(s) after CEO exit.4.3. Other interventions that induce LLP procyclicalityThe literature that test the cyclicality hypothesis arguing
that bank provisioning behaviour is procyclical with business
cycle developments and reinforces the current state of thes research: A review, Borsa _Istanbul Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
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Metzemakers, 2005), can be extended to provide some insight
on whether provisioning under Basel capital rule imparts
procyclicality to fluctuating credit markets, and comparison
should be made between emerging and developed countries
due to differences in Basel enforcement and supervision, as
some emerging countries tend to adopt less-stringent or
modified Basel standards. More so, there might be a weak link
between non-discretionary LLPs and deteriorating economic
conditions (as opposed to theory) in economies where there
are government guarantees on bank lending to several high-
risk sectors, where the government guarantee to cover poten-
tial losses arising from lending to those sectors, thereby
temporarily inducing LLP procyclicality when loan losses
materialise. In addition to government guarantees on bank
loan, future research should provide some insight on other
unique intervention or national characteristics that may
temporarily induce LLP procyclicality in emerging countries
where it might be difficult to implement a dynamic provi-
sioning system.4.4. Dynamic LLPs versus transparent LLPsIn the dynamic provisioning literature, researchers and
policy makers advocate the need for a counter-cyclical or
dynamic provisioning system. Following our discussion in
Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, there is the need for more clarity on
whether provisions or capital should be used as a counter-
cyclical measure by banks in response to economic shocks
or shocks in credit markets, keeping in mind that provisions
are intended for expected losses, not for abnormal/unexpected
shocks. Of course, some would argue that both capital and
provisions should be used simultaneously as counter-cyclical
measures but we need evidence to support this hypothesis or
claim; therefore, future research should provide insights in this
direction. Finally, assuming dynamic provisioning is consid-
ered to be the only practical solution that mitigates LLP pro-
cyclicality, future research should suggest ways to maintain
some equilibrium between designing a sound countercyclical
provisioning system and at the same time ensuring the re-
ported dynamic LLP estimates are transparent, keeping in
mind that dynamic provisions, which is speculative, can
dampen the reliability and informativeness of reported loan
loss provision estimates to users of bank financial statements.4.5. Political costThe literature that test the income smoothing hypothesis, to
date, report mixed evidence among developed and developing
country studies depending on the time-period examined.
Going forward, the recent empirical income smoothing liter-
ature that examine large banks/firms has not paid much
attention to ‘political costs’ that may influence managers' ac-
counting choice to smooth income. For instance, the main-
stream understanding of why banks smooth income among
banking researchers is presumably to save up some profit in
good times to act as buffers to smooth out losses in bad timesPlease cite this article in press as: Ozili, P. K., & Outa, E., Bank loan loss provision
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influence financial reporting outcomes that depend on reported
earning numbers. Further still, there is a third idea which is e
could it be that banks use LLPs to smooth income to avoid
(regulatory, political and media) scrutiny that follows report-
ing excessive profits or huge losses? This is the political cost
argument. However, the ‘political cost’ and the ‘income
smoothing’ arguments are not mutually exclusive because
banks could smooth earnings to avoid the associated political
cost of reporting too high earnings; therefore, political cost is
one explanation for income smoothing but it is not the only
explanation. On the other hand, income smoothing can explain
the political cost argument because banks can smooth losses
by increasing earnings upward when they expect losses to
avoid sending a signal to bank regulators that the bank might
fail if such signal could attract scrutiny of the bank's earnings
by regulators and political commentators; in this case, the
income smoothing hypothesis explains why banks seek to
avoid political scrutiny. Additionally, banks can use income
smoothing as a method which achieves both objectives, that is,
to reduce earnings in good years and increase earnings in bad
years so that reported earnings never seem to be too high or
too low to attract regulatory or political scrutiny. Future
research should incorporate the political cost argument in their
inquiry into income smoothing as an alternative explanation
for the use of LLPs to smooth income, as this is currently
lacking in the recent LLP literature.4.6. Reconciling accounting and prudential LLP
requirementsAnother emerging theme in the LLP literature is the conflict
between prudential regulatory objectives and accounting
standard setting objectives (Gaston & Song, 2014). After the
2008 financial crisis, bank regulators require banks to take
pro-active or forward-looking measures towards provisioning
which includes keeping sufficient (or high) LLPs even when
expected credit risk is apparently low so that banks can have
enough loan loss reserves/provisions to act as buffers to absorb
loan losses that materialise during bad times (FSF, 2009;
Adrian & Shin, 2010; Balla, Rose, & Romero, 2012). The
practice of keeping LLP at an amount above the level that is
commensurate with banks' expected credit risk is consistent
with the bank safety and stability objective of bank supervisors
from a prudential regulation perspective but is criticised by
accounting standard setters because such practice constitute
manipulation of accounting numbers which reduces the reli-
ability of reported LLP estimates in financial reports and can
mislead bank stakeholders and analysts. Furthermore, inter-
national accounting standards (IFRS and FASB) oppose the
provisioning for loan losses that are unlikely to occur, and
only approve of bank provisioning for loan losses that are
highly probable if the amount of the loss can be reasonably
estimated, they follow this approach to prevent banks from
using loan loss provisions (or reserves) as a tool to manipulate/
manage reported earnings e a common practice where bank
managers could shift income from good quarters to bads research: A review, Borsa _Istanbul Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
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small provisions when income are low (Balla et al., 2012), and
accounting standard-setters maintain that this kind of manip-
ulation of provisions (and reserves) reduces the reliability and
informativeness of LLP estimates and the transparency of
bank financial report.
Going forward, future research should provide solutions or
suggestions on how to reconcile these differences. Some ideas
from several commentators suggest that financial statements
should report two LLP estimates which are ‘IFRS provisions’
and ‘regulatory provisions’ with the latter being higher than
the former, as a way to avoid misleading financial statement
users. Other commentators disagree with the idea of two
provisions estimates and rather want standard setters to
completely replace the incurred loss provisioning model with
a forward-looking model (such as the expected credit loss
provisioning model) in the new IFRS rules which would
substantially increase LLP estimates, which of course elimi-
nates the need to report two LLP estimates for IFRS and Basel.
More suggestions are needed and future studies could provide
actionable policy direction in this area. Finally, any solution
reached between prudential regulators and standard setters
should be one that maintains a reasonable balance or equi-
librium between sufficient provisioning which regulators want
and the reliability of LLP estimates which accounting standard
setters want.4.7. LLP behaviour in emerging regional blocsFinally, the LLP practices of banks in some emerging
regional contexts remain unexplored in the literature, and
there are opportunities for future research to examine these
regional and other cross-country contexts. For instance,
regional economic blocs can collectively provide solutions
that minimises bank losses in anticipation of bad times and/
or provide rescue packages to rescue the failing financial
system of any member country; thereby, reducing procycli-
cality at least temporarily. It would be interesting to see
whether financial stability guarantees to member countries in
regional economic blocs can reduce LLP procyclicality in
member countries experiencing rising loan losses due bad
economic times. For instance, some regional economic blocs
contexts include banks in OPEC countries, OECD countries,
NAFTA countries, G8 countries, Eurozone, EU, BRIC,
ASEAN, G20 and Latin American and Caribbean (LAC)
region, etc. More so, future research could provide some
insight about the behaviour of bank LLPs in response to
changing economic conditions, comparing countries in
regional economic blocs with countries in other regional
economic blocs.
5. Ethics and factors influencing income smoothing
Income smoothing is one of most debated issues in the LLP
literature; therefore, this section focus on the ethical di-
mensions of income smoothing and also highlights several
factors that influence income smoothing behaviour amongPlease cite this article in press as: Ozili, P. K.,& Outa, E., Bank loan loss provision
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an exhaustive list of all factors that influence the income
smoothing behaviour of every bank; however, we have identify
some notable factors in the literature that can influence the
income smoothing behaviour of banks. We now begin with
ethics in smoothing income.5.1. Is income smoothing ethical?The question above seems easy but is quite difficult to
answer. Whatever answer we postulate depends on what we
mean by ‘ethical’ while noting that the meaning of the term
‘ethics’ depend on the context and circumstance of the social
agent(s) facing an ethical dilemma. Bank income smoothing
behaviour itself does not constitute an outright violation of
bank regulatory/supervisory rules and does not constitute an
outright violation of accounting standards whether rule-based
or principles-based because income smoothing practices arise
from exercising managerial discretion in financial reporting
and in meeting prudential regulatory requirements, and both
regulatory frameworks permit managerial discretion in bank
financial reporting. This, therefore, leave academics, policy
researchers, regulators and accounting standard-setters with
the question: is it ethical for firms (and banks) to smooth re-
ported earnings?
Whether income smoothing is ethical or unethical should
depend on the motive for doing so. Income smoothing by bank
managers may be considered ‘ethical’ if they do so to: save for
a rainy day (Greenawalt & Sinkey, 1988), to protect their jobs
(DeFond & Park, 1997; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1995), to reduce
information asymmetry between owners and managers
(Tucker & Zarowin, 2006), to improve bank stability by
smoothing out abnormal fluctuations in reported earnings
(Wall & Koch, 2000), and to improve the risk perception of
bondholders and regulators/supervisors about the bank (El
Sood, 2012).
On the other hand, bank income smoothing may be
considered ‘unethical’ if they do so: to opportunistically
receive bonuses (Healy, 1985), to reduce the informativeness
of reported earnings (Leventis et al., 2011), to increase the
opacity of bank financial reporting (Bhattacharya, Daouk, &
Welker, 2003), to lower the quality of reported earnings
(Ahmed, Neel, & Wang, 2013), and to avoid shareholder
interference or to avoid tax and improve terms of trade and
pursue a fixed dividend pay-out ratio (Vander Bauwhede,
1998).5.2. Factors influencing income smoothing
5.2.1. Motivation to smooth income
One, capital markets create incentives for banks to smooth
reported earnings. This view argue that if smoothed earnings
reduces earnings variability then lower earnings variability
would translate to lower stock price fluctuations which reduces
the volatility of stock return and investors prefer lower stock
return volatility. Anandarajan et al. (2007) and Leventis et al.
(2011) find evidence to support this claim.s research: A review, Borsa _Istanbul Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
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regulators and political commentators also create incentive for
firms to smooth their profit particularly for larger firms that
report excessive profits (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997). Simi-
larly, banks can smooth reported earnings to avoid excessive
scrutiny of banks' profit by bank regulators/supervisors.
Three, regulatory arbitrage can create incentives to smooth
income as banks can take advantage of existing weaknesses or
loopholes in regulation as an opportunity to smooth reported
earnings, given their opportunity. For instance, Kilic et al.
(2012) show that US banks use LLPs to smooth earnings
when accounting disclosure regulation made it difficult to use
derivatives to smooth bank earnings.
Four, the trade-off between rule-based vs principles-based
accounting standards also create incentives for banks to
smooth income. Ashraf, Hassan, and Putnam (2014) investi-
gate whether changes in accounting standards and prudential
regulatory regimes influence the use of LLPs to smooth
earnings among 7343 banks from 118 countries during the
1999e2010 period. They find that banks under a rule-based
accounting regime exhibit higher levels of income smooth-
ing compared to banks under a principles-based accounting
regime.
Five, corruption can increase the extent of bank income
smoothing because corruption in banks manifest through non-
transparent reporting, and greater income smoothing decreases
the transparency of bank financial reporting (Bhattacharya
et al., 2003; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2003).
Six, competition also create incentives for firms (including
banks) to smooth income because earnings smoothing in
competitive environments may help firms prosper in the short-
run but at the same time can reduce firms' ability to compete in
the long-run (Marciukaityte & Park, 2009). Francis, LaFond,
Olsson, and Schipper (2004) observe that income smoothing
help firms to reduce the cost of capital by reducing informa-
tion asymmetry between managers and investors and increases
firms' ability to compete while Marciukaityte and Park (2009)
find that firms report higher income smoothing ratios and
conclude that firms in competitive environments are more
likely to engage in earnings smoothing practices.
Seven, transient economic events can create additional in-
centives for banks to smooth income. Liu and Ryan (2006)
find that US banks use LLPs to smooth income during the
1990 economic boom. El Sood (2012) finds that US banks
accelerate LLPs to smooth earnings when they are more
profitable and during non-recessionary periods while Balboa
et al. (2013) find that US banks use LLPs to smooth earn-
ings when earnings are more profitable.
Eight, national culture can encourage income smoothing
behaviour among banks because banks in societies that
encourage high risk-taking, implicitly as a culture, may record
relatively lower LLPs in good times and higher LLPs in bad
times which allow banks to smooth income. Kanagaretnam,
Lim, and Lobo (2011) in a cross-country study examine the
relationship between four dimensions of national culture and
earnings quality during the pre-financial crisis period and find
that banks in high individualism, high power distance and lowPlease cite this article in press as: Ozili, P. K., & Outa, E., Bank loan loss provision
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LLPs. They also observe that cultures that encourage high
risk-taking experience more bank troubles in the form of larger
losses or larger provisions during the global financial crisis.
5.2.2. Constraint to smooth income
One, strict accounting disclosure regulation can reduce the
opportunities for bank managers to manipulate LLP estimates
to smooth reported earnings. Leventis et al. (2011) show that
income smoothing via LLP is reduced after IFRS adoption.
Balla and Rose (2015) examine whether accounting con-
straints introduced by the US SEC in 1998 limit LLP-based
income smoothing among US banks and find that shortly
after the SEC enforced the accounting constraint the rela-
tionship between LLPs and earnings weakened for publicly-
held banks but not for privately-held banks, implying
reduced income smoothing. Abdul Adzis et al. (2016) inves-
tigate the impact of IAS 39 among banks in Hong Kong and
find that bank income smoothing via LLP is reduced after the
adoption and compliance with IAS 39. Two, strong religiosity
can discourage the use of LLP estimates to manipulate re-
ported earnings. Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Wang (2015)
investigate the impact of religiosity on bank earning quality
and find that religiosity is negatively related to earnings
smoothing. Taktak, Zouari, and Boudriga (2010) did not find
evidence for bank income smoothing via LLPs for Islamic
banks. Three, higher audit quality can constrain the extent of
income smoothing because the presence of a Big-4 auditor is
often considered to reflect superior audit quality and their
presence should discourage opportunistic earnings manipula-
tion (DeAngelo, 1981). Consistently, Kanagaretnam et al.
(2010) find less aggressive income smoothing behaviour
among banks that have a Big-4 auditor. Four, strong investor
protection should discourage bank income smoothing. Fonseca
and Gonzalez (2008) in a cross country study find that bank
earnings smoothing behaviour decreases with stronger investor
protection while Shen and Chih (2005) find that strong pro-
tection of minority shareholders rights discourage bank earn-
ings management behaviour but legal enforcement quality had
no impact on bank earnings management. Five, certain bank
ownership structure can also provide additional monitoring to
discourage the use of LLPs for income smoothing. Fan and
Wong (2002) investigate the relationship between earnings
informativeness and ownership structure for 977 companies in
seven East Asian economies and find that concentrated
ownership is associated with low earnings informativeness.
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) find that industrial firms
with dispersed ownership structure engage in less earnings
management. Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011) investi-
gate the implication of mandatory IFRS adoption for ac-
counting quality among EU banks and find that income
smoothing is pronounced among listed European banks that
are widely held (disperse ownership) while Bouvatier et al.
(2014) find that income smoothing is reduced among EU
banks with disperse ownership. Six, strict banking supervision
can also reduce the extent of bank income smoothing. Cavallo
and Majnoni (2002, pp. 319e342) and Bouvatier et al. (2014)s research: A review, Borsa _Istanbul Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
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countries with strong banking supervision.
6. Methodological: advances and issues
The baseline model often employed to investigate the de-
terminants of bank provisioning (Ahmed et al., 1999; Laeven
& Majnoni, 2003; Wahlen, 1994), and is expressed as:
Discretionary Provisions ¼ f (non-discretionary provisions,
relevant bank-specific factors, institutional factors, country
and/or regional factors).
Depending on the objective of the researcher, the regression
model is specified to obtain the functional form of the rela-
tionship the researcher is investigating. For this reason, it is
difficult to criticise the LLP regression model employed by a
researcher without understanding the research objective and
the underlying assumptions taken into consideration by the
researcher.
In estimating LLP models, several econometric adjustments
are made to the model such as pooled/panel adjustments,
fixed/random effects, static/dynamic panel adjustments, sys-
tem/difference GMM model adjustments (see Cavallo &
Majnoni, 2002, pp. 319e342; Laeven & Majnoni, 2003;
Packer & Zhu, 2012; Floro, 2010; Leventis et al., 2011; El
Sood, 2012; Bouvatier et al., 2014; Curcio & Hasan, 2015;
Ozili, 2017a), while other studies combine regression
models with other methods in their analyses with only few
studies employing qualitative approach while examining bank
LLPs (see Balasubramanyan, Zaman, & Thomson, 2013).
One major progress in LLP modelling has been the
reduction in construct validity problems. Unlike construct
validity issues commonly associated with estimating accruals
(DeFond, 2010),6 the measures (or proxies) used to measure
discretionary LLPs and its determinants in most LLP models
have low construct validity problems because there have been
some serious commitment among academics and researchers
to ensure that each LLP construct and the explanatory vari-
ables measure what it intends to measure; therefore, there
appear to be a high degree of confidence that the proxies used
in LLP research (published in peer-reviewed journal) actually
measure the underlying theoretical construct they intend to
measure.
Furthermore, several studies have identified a number of
factors that explain changes in the level of bank provisions in
an attempt to reduce the size of the error term, such as com-
mission and fee income, amongst others. For instance, com-
mission and fee income reflects bank income diversity and
measures banks' willingness to engage in non-depository ac-
tivities; and when this is the case, banks will keep more LLPs
to remain safe while it offer multiple services that are unre-
lated to its core deposit-taking activities (Anandarajan et al.,
2007; Leventis et al., 2011).6 Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) present an extensive literature review on
earnings quality.
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data (Anandarajan et al., 2007; Leventis et al., 2011;
Bushman & Williams, 2012; Jin et al., 2016), while many
studies' sample period span through the pre-crisis, during-
crisis and post-crisis period to enable comparison before,
during and after the global financial crisis (Cummings and
Durrani, 2016; Soedarmono et al., 2017; Andries et al.,
2017; Ozili, 2017a,b; Andries et al., 2017) while very few
LLP studies examine a longer time period in post-crisis
years and such studies, if present, can capture new regula-
tory changes affecting provisions in the post-crisis period to
date. Therefore, there is need for more post-crisis studies
keeping in mind that post-crisis sample period might be too
narrow.
Regarding sample data, a combination of several data
source and/or database have also been employed in the liter-
ature, notably data from Bankscope database (now dis-
continued), Fitch, Compustat, bank financial statements,
confidential databases, data from bank regulators, Datastream,
Thomson One Banker, World Bank etc.
Finally, several country control variables have been used in
much cross-country studies to capture institutional and mac-
roeconomic factors that influence the level of bank provisions,
and these variables include real gross domestic product growth
rate (reflecting business cycle fluctuation), minority share-
holder rights protection (reflecting investor protection), reli-
giosity, legal systems, banking supervision, inflation,
accounting disclosure regulation, monetary policy rate, polit-
ical economy (see, Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Floro, 2010;
Bushman &Williams, 2012; Pool, De Haan, & Jacobs, 2015).
However, using these control variables depend on whether
institutional data is publicly available and accessible for the
country-context examined.
One major methodology issue in the empirical literature
is the choice of deflator for LLP (dependent) variable and
the explanatory variables. Commonly used deflators include:
total assets (see, Cavallo & Majnoni, 2002, pp. 319e342; El
Sood, 2012; Bouvatier et al., 2014; Curcio & Hasan, 2015;
Ozili, 2015), beginning total assets (see, Kanagaretnam
et al., 2010; Kilic et al., 2012), beginning total loans (see,
Bushman & Williams, 2012), gross or average loan (see,
Anandarajan et al., 2007; Leventis et al., 2011). For
instance, using average loan as a deflator for the earnings
variable takes into account banks' business model for banks
that have a large loan portfolio while using beginning total
asset deflator takes into account banks' actual size without
reference to future investments in bank assets while using
total asset as a deflator takes into account future investments
in bank assets. To date, the literature shows no consensus
about the choice of deflator. Furthermore, the pooling
together of the LLP and total asset values of large and small
banks may give rise to concerns that the LLP and total asset
distributions will be skewed due to substantial differences in
bank size and provisioning levels. One way to address this
issue would be to normalise the LLP and total asset vari-
ables by taking the natural logarithm of LLP and total
assets.s research: A review, Borsa _Istanbul Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
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+ MODEL7. Challenges in LLP research7.1. Comparability of LLP estimates e a critiqueLLP research may be complicated by the process, as-
sumptions, methods and other unobservable factors that bank
managers take into consideration to determine LLP estimates.
This means that LLP is a function of the accounting system
that generates the estimate, the assumptions made and the
decisions of the bank manager and other considerations that
remain unknown or unobservable to the empirical researcher
at the time of investigation. Because researchers are not privy
to full information regarding the determination of LLP esti-
mates, the comparability of LLP estimates from one bank to
another bank can be difficult and even more difficult when
comparing LLP estimates among banks across countries,
making it difficult to compare the findings of several empirical
studies.7.2. Two conflicting LLP estimatesInternational accounting standards (IFRS) propose the
incurred loss provisioning model while the Basel Committee
for Banking Supervision (BCBS) proposes the expected credit
loss provisioning model.7 The expected credit loss model
generates higher LLP estimates while the incurred loss model
generates a lower LLP estimates. These two models yield two
different LLP estimates and therefore pose an issue. For
instance, if banks are not required to strictly adopt one of the
two models, bank managers can choose to adopt the expected
credit loss provisioning model when they want to reduce high
profit because the expected credit loss model generates high
LLPs; alternatively, bank managers can choose to adopt the
incurred loss provisioning model to increase low earnings
since the incurred loss model generates lower LLP estimate.
While there is no definitive solution to reconcile the conflict
between these two LLPs estimates (Balla et al., 2012;
Bushman & Landsman, 2010), one possible attempt to
reconcile this conflict would be to persuade accounting
standard-setters to replace the incurred loss model with a
forward-looking provisioning model which is also in line with
the expected credit loss provisioning model (Gaston & Song,
2014). Nevertheless, any attempt to reconcile these conflicts
should take into account (i) the role of the complex interaction
between the accounting, macroeconomic and prudential
framework of a country; (ii) the fact that the level of LLPs (in7 There are two provisioning models: the incurred loss model and the ex-
pected credit loss model introduced by accounting standard setters and Basel
regulation, respectively. Basel II regulation employ the ‘expected credit loss
provisioning’ model which emphasizes the recognition of credit risk based on
the borrower's economic and financial conditions even if the loss has not been
incurred (see, Gaston & Song, 2014; BCBS, 2015). The objective of this
model is to build sufficient provisions in addition to bank capital to cover the
risk banks take. The incurred loss provisioning model, on the other hand,
requires banks to increase loan loss reserves (provisions) only when it be-
comes highly probable that a loss is imminent, and if the amount of that loss
can be reasonably estimated.
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(in the balance sheet) is only as good as the methodology used
to determine such estimates (Angklomkliew, George, &
Packer, 2009), and that forward-looking provisioning gives
bank managers a licence to engage in speculative provisioning
practices (Bushman & Williams, 2012).7.3. Paucity of critical studiesA fourth concern is the paucity of critical studies in the
LLP literature. By critical studies, we do not mean critical
studies that invalidate prior findings; rather, we mean studies
that challenge the proxies used and assumptions underlying
current LLP models in order to increase the commitment of
researchers to ensure that existing and new proxies continue to
measure what they are intended to measure. The need for such
critical studies is paramount. However, we are aware that the
lack of critical studies in LLP research may be attributed to the
fact that policy makers, financial economists and academic
researchers are more interested in LLP research that is result-
driven, mainly the need to see results. As long as academic
researchers interested in LLP research continue to take a
positivist (quantitative) approach to LLP research, it could
take a long time for a considerable number of critical LLP
studies to emerge. Also, the fewer the number of academics
interested in LLP research, the more difficult it is for critical
studies to emerge.7.4. Qualitative studiesThe final concern is that LLP research is dominated by
quantitative methods while there are little or no qualitative
studies on LLP research. A look at the first fifty peer-reviewed
LLP articles chosen at random in Google scholar search en-
gine from 2012 to 2016 confirm that LLP studies that use
qualitative or non-regression models are unpopular among
empirical LLP studies at least for now; and there is at least one
study that use qualitative research methods
(see Balasubramanyan et al., 2013). One explanation for this
in our view is that LLP research appears to be of little of in-
terest to the qualitative or non-empirical researcher. We need
to find a way to attract non-empirical researchers to LLP
research because there are interesting research questions that
regression models cannot provide answer to. Also, we need
qualitative studies to verify or check whether the findings of
qualitative LLP research are consistent with the theory un-
derlying the findings of most empirical LLP studies.
8. Additional future direction
One, continuous revision to Basel capital accord provide
new opportunities for future LLP research. Changes in Basel
capital regulation may require a change in the LLP component
of regulatory capital, and such changes may take years for its
full effect to be felt. While prior studies investigate the impact
of Basel I on bank provisioning decisions (e.g. Ahmed et al.,
1999), much studies that examine the impact of Basel II ands research: A review, Borsa _Istanbul Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
8 The new IFRS provisioning model, the ‘expected credit loss model’ will
replace the incurred loss model in 2018. The model requires credit loss
recognition to be forward-looking rather than when an actual loss event oc-
curs. Under this model, “credit losses are measured at different stages, marked
by 12-month and life-time expected credit loss recognitions. In the so called
first stage, 12-months' expected credit losses are recognized. When assets
experience significant increase of credit risk, they enter the second stage and
life-time expected losses are to be assessed and measured.” (Gaston & Song,
2014, p. 11).
16 P.K. Ozili, E. Outa / Borsa _Istanbul Review xx (2017) 1e20
+ MODELIII on discretionary bank provisioning are yet to emerge.
Future studies could investigate the impact of Basel III regu-
lation on banks' provisioning discretion to shed some insight
on how changes in capital regulation rules affects banks'
provisioning discretion and its implication for banking sta-
bility and financial reporting transparency.
Two, the literature do not provide insight on the provi-
sioning practices of banks that are classified as ‘systemic
important financial institutions’ (SIFIs) compared to bank that
are classified as ‘non-systemic important financial institutions’
(non-SIFIs). This classification of banks and other financial
institutions as ‘systemic’ is recent and there is little knowledge
in the literature about the financial reporting characteristics of
systemic firms. So far, we are aware that the LLPs of large
SIFI banks are more procyclical than the LLPs of small (and
non-SIFI) banks (Olszak et al., 2016). Additional insight is
needed to fully understand the behaviour of LLPs among SIFIs
and non-SIFIs. For example, it is interesting to investigate
whether SIFIs use LLPs differently than non-SIFIs and
whether SIFIs collectively use LLPs to report competitive
earnings and to manage capital levels.
Three, regarding income smoothing, capital management
and the signalling hypotheses, prior studies pay little attention
to whether there are overlapping motivations to distort LLP
estimates and the factors that influence the choice for one over
the other. By overlapping motivations, we mean that bank
managers may feel the pressure to signal information to in-
vestors and to smooth income at the same time but they can
only achieve one at a time not both. Future research can
provide insights to improve our understanding of banks' de-
cision regarding the use of LLPs when they face conflicting
motivations.
Four, regarding dynamic loan loss provisioning, there is the
argument that increased scrutiny and supervision should guide
the implementation of dynamic provisioning process (Bikker
& Metzemakers, 2005; Saurina, 2009). Future research is
needed to demonstrate how several monitoring and supervi-
sory models would guide regulators in a dynamic loan loss
provisioning system while bearing in mind that the willingness
of bank regulators/supervisors to supervise bank provisioning
decisions may also depend on (i) whether regulators believe
they should supervise banks' accounting practices; (ii) the
extent to which regulators believe auditors should perform the
supervisory role; and (iii) whether an independent supervisory
body should be created to perform this role even if doing so
further complicates the already complex accounting, fiscal and
prudential bank regulatory network. Future research could
clarify how supervision will guide the dynamic provisioning
process and not interfere with the accounting and audit role.
9. Comments and concluding remark
Looking forward, counter-cyclical or dynamic loan loss
provisioning is a policy experiment and just like every
experiment caution must be taken. Bank supervisors in many
countries are reluctant to enforce a dynamic loan loss provi-
sioning system for banks because it is a policy experiment and,Please cite this article in press as: Ozili, P. K.,& Outa, E., Bank loan loss provision
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tries may eventually adopt this system of provisioning in the
near future as more country-specific success stories emerge,
such as Spain. The usual caveat apply that the best solution is
not always implemented if the perceived cost outweighs its
benefits. If the perceived cost of implementing and monitoring
a dynamic loan loss provisioning system is greater than its
intended benefit, then dynamic provisioning may not be
implemented in some countries at least for now even if it
solves the problem of LLP procyclicality. While the on-going
debate seem to converge towards the need for national bank
supervisors to adopt a dynamic loan loss provisioning system,
the process of determining the exact time to trigger dynamic
provisions during business cycle developments remain an
inexact science and cannot be predicted by static models.
Another issue worth noting is that accounting standard-
setters face political pressure to replace the incurred loss
provisioning model with the expected credit loss provisioning
model. From legitimacy theory, we understand that accounting
(and accounting rules) is socially constructed and exist within
a context that supports it (Guthrie and Parker; 1989; Deegan,
2006), therefore it is easy to predict that accounting standard
setters will bow to the pressure of bank regulators in order to
maintain their legitimacy in the banking industry. The IASB
and IASC will adjust their provisioning models to reflect
forward-looking LLP discretion to retain their legitimacy in
the wider regulatory framework for financial system stability.
For instance, the IASB's IFRS 9 ‘expected credit loss provi-
sioning model’ to be implemented in 2018 could replace the
incurred-loss model,8 although the new model does not specify
a particular measurement methodology to estimate LLPs
rather it permits significant managerial discretion in deter-
mining what LLP estimates should be and such discretion is
permitted to allow banks meet the needs of bank regulators/
supervisors although it remain critical that banks can exploit
such discretion to smooth or manipulate reported earnings.
To conclude, our survey provides some notable insights to
extend LLP literature since the work of Wall and Koch (2000).
First, our survey show that LLP studies in recent times have
made a significant transition from narrow country-specific
studies towards studies that examine how LLP interacts with
the larger macroeconomic, accounting, cultural, prudential and
institutional factors across several countries. Second, we
observe that the association between LLPs and economic
fluctuation for micro prudential regulation depends crucially
on the regulatory treatment of LLPs either as a buffer against
expected (and unexpected) losses or as a forward-lookings research: A review, Borsa _Istanbul Review (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
17P.K. Ozili, E. Outa / Borsa _Istanbul Review xx (2017) 1e20
+ MODELmechanism because endowing banks with more discretion in
the build-up and release of LLPs can have countercyclical
effects, which is desirable by bank regulators. Third, regarding
the debate between sufficient LLPs versus transparent LLPs,
we suggest that a compromise can be reached between ac-
counting standard setters and bank regulators that allows for
sufficient bank provisioning while at the same time reducing
opportunities for banks to manipulate LLP estimates; thereby,
improving LLPs' transparency. Four, our survey findings show
that banks across countries use their discretion for purposes
that do not reflect the underlying economic reality of banks or
their true financial condition. Finally, we note that several
provisioning models have been designed to ensure that bank
provisions are adequate and such models are only as good as
the assumptions underlying such models and the inputs
included in such models. Regardless of the novelty of any
provisioning system imposed on banks by regulators, there is
the need to actively limit bank managers' discretion in deter-
mining LLP estimates. If bank managers continue to retain
significant control on what inputs to include in (or exclude
from) LLP models, such models may not yield the intended
level of provisioning bank supervisors expect. Furthermore, if
standard setters, bank supervisors and policy makers do not
pay attention to specific accounting judgements made by bank
managers in relation to LLPs, the issue of opportunistic in-
come smoothing is likely to remain. From a standard setting
perspective, there should be a limit to managerial discretion in
provisioning because it seems rather illogical for standard-
setters to have evidence that bank managers manipulate
LLPs to smooth income, to receive bonus,9 to manage regu-
latory capital and to signal future prospects, and then blame a
methodology for such practice without putting the blame on
managers who make provisioning decisions themselves
keeping in mind that managers also control the input of such
models.
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